Economic Outlook Amid Multiple Crises (UK)

The confluence of challenges a series of global & national challenges – from climate change to demographic shifts to inequality and political turmoil – has led many experts to warn of difficult times ahead. In the short term (1–5 years), the consensus among economists is generally pessimistic about a quick return to strong growth or markedly better living standards, especially for the UK. Over the medium term (5–20 years), there is potential for improvement if significant policy changes are made, but without such changes the outlook remains subdued. In the long term (20–50 years), much will depend on how we handle critical issues like climate change and aging; these could either be brought under control or, if left unaddressed, lead to far worse outcomes. Below, we break down the expert views on each timeframe and discuss what mainstream and heterodox economists suggest could be done – particularly in the UK – to turn things around.

Short-Term Outlook (1–5 Years): “Muddling Through” Rather Than Miraculous Recovery

Most economists do not foresee things getting dramatically better in the next few years. In the UK, the immediate reality is a “cost of living crisis” hangover and slow growth. After the inflation surge of 2022–2023, real wages and incomes have been eroded, and any recovery is expected to be very gradual. The Resolution Foundation’s Economy 2030 inquiry, for example, notes that British households are emerging from the pandemic and energy price spike with “low levels of financial resilience,” and forecasts that median household incomes won’t regain their pre-crisis peak until 2027 at the earliest. In other words, the average UK family is facing at least several more years before their real incomes climb back to where they were before the recent inflation shock. This aligns with the impression many hold, especially amongst younger adults (see CFLS study) that “hard work isn’t paying off” – indeed, an astonishing statistic is that a typical full-time male worker in 2024 earned 7% less (after inflation) than his equivalent did 20 years earlier. Fifteen years of wage stagnation in the UK means many people have seen no progress or even backward movement in living standards, breeding the frustration felt by millions of Brits.

Globally, the picture is only somewhat better. The world economy is not in free-fall – many forecasters think a mild recovery is underway – but it’s “highly volatile, marked by significant uncertainty”. For instance, the World Economic Forum’s Chief Economists Outlook finds a sense of cautious optimism that inflation will ease and growth will pick up modestly in 2024–25, with interest rates possibly declining. However, almost no one expects a return to boom times imminently. The consensus is for sub-par growth in the near term, with substantial downside risks. The IMF’s latest review of the UK echoes this balanced view: they project the UK will grow about 1.2% in 2025 (and a little more in 2026) – an improvement from near-recession, but still weak by historical standards. Crucially, the IMF warns that “weak productivity” will continue to weigh on medium-term growth prospects, meaning the UK cannot simply rely on a post-COVID bounce-back to regain its old growth trend. Private economists likewise predict only “tepid” growth for the UK in the next few years, on the order of 1% per year, absent major changes.

Multiple headwinds are expected to persist in the short run. High energy prices (exacerbated by conflicts like Russia’s war in Ukraine) and supply chain disruptions have driven up inflation worldwide, causing central banks to hike interest rates. Those higher rates, in turn, dampen business investment and consumer spending. The UK has the added headache of Brexit’s legacy (reduced trade openness) and what the Bank of England calls a “negative supply shock” to the labour market (many older workers left the workforce post-pandemic, and immigration rules tightened). All this translates to sluggish growth. As you noted, business investment in sectors like leisure/hospitality is very weak – a symptom of low confidence and demand. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) points out that the UK’s productivity growth has been dismal since 2008, averaging only ~0.4% annually (half the rate of other rich countries). With such poor productivity, it’s hard to get robust GDP or wage growth. In the short term, most ordinary households will continue to feel squeezed, as any pay increases are likely to barely keep up with prices. It’s no wonder surveys show people losing faith that “hard work pays off.” As the Resolution Foundation put it bluntly, Britain today finds itself in a “stagnation nation” – 15 years into relative economic decline with stagnant incomes and rising inequality.

On top of these economic drags, political and social factors are contributing to uncertainty in the short run. Populist and authoritarian political movements (from the far-right surging in some European elections to the instability in U.S. politics) create policy unpredictability, which can deter investment. Geopolitical tensions – not just Russia’s aggression but also U.S.-China trade conflicts – weigh on global trade and cooperation. The OBR even calculated that a full-blown global trade war (say, a 20% tariff barrier between major economies) could shave about 1% off UK GDP within 5 years, which would essentially nullify the already meagre growth forecast. Additionally, as you mentioned, foreign adversaries spreading disinformation and division (e.g. Russian interference) add to social fragmentation, which indirectly affects economic stability (for instance, by making it harder to build consensus for any economic reform). While these issues are harder to quantify, experts do acknowledge them. The World Economic Forum’s risk assessments increasingly talk about a “polycrisis”, where economic, geopolitical, and environmental risks feed into one another – exactly the kind of combined pressure you’re worried about.

Bottom line for the short term: pessimism is largely echoed by experts. There is broad agreement that, in the next few years, we’re not going to suddenly escape these woes. “Everything is shit” might be too strong for an economist to say, but there is a clear recognition that we’re in a rut. As one UK minister (Torsten Bell, formerly an economist) recently put it, “you cannot have a failing state and a growing economy” – meaning the neglect of public services and social infrastructure is now a brake on growth. When hospital backlogs keep workers sick (a “sickness tax on every business” in Bell’s words) and when high crime or poor transport force the private sector to spend extra just to function, it all adds up. Many economists argue that this is exactly the trap the UK is in right now. So, over the next 1–5 years, the consensus expectation is for very modest growth at best, and a continued struggle for many households to make ends meet. Things might stop getting worse – for instance, inflation should fall and real wages might inch up again – but a return to the pre-2008 feeling of broad prosperity is not on the near-term horizon.

That said, few experts would say nothing can improve in the short term. One glimmer of optimism: as inflation comes down from its peak, and if energy prices stabilize, real incomes could at least stabilize too. Some forecasters even see a small rise in UK GDP in the next year due to pent-up demand and easing monetary policy. Unemployment in the UK is still relatively low, and if a recession is avoided, even slow growth could keep joblessness down. In the U.S. and Europe, economists are a bit more optimistic than in the UK; for example, nearly 9 in 10 chief economists surveyed expect at least moderate growth in the U.S. in 2024. So it’s not universal doom and gloom everywhere – but “cautious optimism” is the strongest sentiment you’ll find. Crucially, as the WEF notes, even those mildly optimistic experts emphasize that the quality of growth needs to improve. There is a “growing consensus” that simply chasing GDP is not enough; progress must also be measured by improvements in sustainability, equality, and social cohesion. And on that front, they admit current efforts are falling short (only 12% of economists in that survey felt we’re doing enough on those broader goals). In summary, no, you’re not “missing something” – the short-term outlook is challenging, and most economists acknowledge that. At best, we might be entering a period of slow healing rather than further injury.

Medium-Term Outlook (5–20 Years): Conditional Hope vs. Structural Headwinds

Looking 5–20 years out, the picture becomes more conditional: outcomes will depend heavily on the policy choices and adjustments we make in the coming years. Economists do not see the current stagnation as an inevitability for the next two decades – if we address some underlying problems, things could markedly improve by the 2030s. However, if we carry on with business-as-usual (muddling through without bold changes), many experts fear that the UK (and some other Western economies) could face a “lost decade” (or two) of low growth and heightened societal strain. In other words, the medium-term future could go in very different directions: there’s a better-case scenario and a worse-case scenario, and economists are split on which is more likely, largely according to their views on whether effective reforms will be implemented.

Let’s consider some of the key factors for the medium term:

• Productivity and Investment: Virtually every economist agrees that reversing the productivity slump is the key to improving medium-term growth. Why has productivity (output per worker) been so flat in the UK? Analyses point to years of underinvestment – both by government (in infrastructure, education, health) and by businesses (in new technologies, training, R&D). Policy uncertainty and austerity after 2010, followed by Brexit disruptions, discouraged a lot of capital investment. The consensus is that without a step-change in investment, the UK’s growth will remain anaemic. The IMF forecasts UK GDP growth of only ~1.4% a year in the medium term under current policies – that’s roughly the speed limit of an economy with weak productivity gains and declining workforce growth. To do better, many economists are calling for aggressive measures to boost investment. For instance, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) argues Britain should double public investment (from ~2.5% to 5% of GDP) over the next few years – an extra £50 billion annually – “largely funded by public borrowing,” specifically to “boost productivity and long-run growth.” They contend this is affordable and necessary, given that, otherwise, they don’t “expect annual growth to exceed ~1.3% between now and 2029”. In short, by the late 2020s and 2030s, the UK could see a revival in growth if it undertakes a concerted investment push now (in infrastructure, green energy, housing, skills, etc.). This is why you hear calls for a new “Marshall Plan” or a “Green New Deal” – large-scale public investments that, in turn, encourage private sector growth and investment. Many economists note that the UK’s capital stock is outdated; for example, public transport, broadband, and housing supply all need upgrading, and doing so would not only create jobs in the short run but raise efficiency in the long run.
  

• Demographics and Aging: By the 2030s and 2040s, the aging population will become a more acute factor. A shrinking share of working-age people and more retirees poses a fiscal and growth challenge. The IMF’s 2025 analysis on global aging finds that all advanced economies will hit a “demographic turning point” by around 2035, after which their working-age population steadily declines. This naturally “poses challenges such as slower growth and increased fiscal pressures” (more spending on pensions and healthcare). However – and this is important – the IMF also emphasizes a silver lining: if people are living healthier for longer, they can remain productive longer. Policies that support healthy aging and enable older people to work a bit longer or more flexibly could “partly offset” the negative impacts of aging on the economy. There is evidence that in many countries, 60-somethings today are healthier and more capable than in past generations, which could boost labour force participation beyond traditional retirement age. So, experts say the medium-term impact of aging isn’t fate; it will depend on things like employment & retirement policies, healthcare improvements, and even robotics/AI (to supplement the human workforce). Nevertheless, by the 2040s the pressure on public finances from pensions and health will be very large unless addressed. In the UK, the OBR projects that state pension costs will rise from ~5% of GDP today to ~7% by 2070 even under current policies (especially with the generous “triple lock” formula). This implies that by the 2030s, tough choices will need to be made – either the pension system is reformed (e.g. higher retirement age or a different indexation than the triple lock) or taxes will have to rise to fund the swelling ranks of pensioners. Medium-term, economists aren’t uniformly doomish on aging – some point to Japan, which despite being the oldest society, has managed low unemployment and decent living standards by adapting its policies. But it’s certainly a headwind: fewer young workers generally means less potential growth, all else equal, putting more onus on productivity gains (which, contextually, have been stagnant since 2008) to carry the load.
  

• Climate Change and Transition: Over a 5–20 year horizon, climate change will move from being a looming future threat to a present, intensifying reality. Here, there is a near-consensus among economists that climate change will harm growth and require serious adaptation efforts. In a global survey of PhD economists, 76% said it is “likely or very likely” that climate change will reduce global economic growth rates (relative to a world without climate change). We’re already seeing more frequent extreme weather events – by the 2030s, these could start to cause significant disruptions (crop failures, infrastructure damage, etc.) in various parts of the world. For the UK specifically, direct climate impacts - like extreme heat or flooding - are a concern (albeit more muted than in some parts of the world), but perhaps more concerning are knock-on effects of climate change globally (food price shocks, climate refugees, conflict in unstable regions) that could affect supply chains and geopolitical stability. The indirect effects of climate stress can lead to socio-political destabilization – countries or regions collapsing into conflict over water, food, or migration. That obviously would have global economic repercussions, much as the recent war in Ukraine affected food prices and partially drove the inflation shock of 2022-23. While such scenarios are hard to model, they’re not far-fetched; defence and security experts often warn that the climate crisis is a “threat multiplier” for war and unrest. Economists incorporate some of this risk by noting higher “tail risks” to growth forecasts as climate impacts mount. By the medium term, the transition to a low-carbon economy is also a big factor. The UK and other countries have committed to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, which implies massive investments in renewable energy, electric vehicles, home insulation, etc., in the 2020s–2040s. These investments can actually be a positive for growth (think of them as another form of needed infrastructure spending). But they also involve shocks to certain industries (e.g. oil & gas extraction will decline; certain regions might lose jobs unless new green industries replace them). The OBR estimated that if climate action is delayed and temperatures ultimately rise by 3°C, the fiscal costs would be enormous – adding an extra 74% of GDP to UK public debt by the early 2070s due to disaster response, health impacts, etc.. Conversely, investing earlier in mitigation and adaptation could reduce those long-run costs. By the 2030s, we’ll likely know which path we’re on. Many economists stress that medium-term growth can only be sustainable if it’s green. In other words, attempting to grow the economy while ignoring climate would be self-defeating, as unchecked climate change would slam the economy later. So in the medium term, we will see a huge restructuring of energy and transport systems. This is challenging (and contributes to the “investment crunch” now, since a lot of capital has to be directed to these projects), but it’s also an opportunity: building a new energy economy could create jobs and industries. There is cautious optimism among experts that technological progress (solar, wind, batteries, possibly hydrogen and carbon capture) will make the transition affordable – over 65% of economists in one survey said they expect continued rapid advances in zero-emissions technologies (solar & wind costs have plummeted, and they believe similar progress will happen in other tech). So, if managed well, by the 2030s the world could be on a cleaner growth path, with new green sectors booming, which would be a more hopeful medium-term scenario.
  

• Political Economy and Inequality: Many of the problems commonly discussed by economists – wealth inequality, billionaire-controlled media, populist politics – fall under this umbrella. For the medium term, a key question is: will political systems enact reforms to address inequality and social discontent, or will things drift toward further polarization? Economists and other experts increasingly recognize that extreme inequality can undermine economic stability and democratic governance. Research has shown how a “vicious spiral” can form: wealth concentration allows the rich to exert outsized influence (through campaign donations, lobbying, or outright media ownership), leading to policies that further entrench their advantage. In democratic societies, if the majority feel the system is rigged and their lot isn’t improving, you get either apathy or support for anti-establishment forces – neither of which is conducive to steady economic progress. In the UK context, the medium-term outlook for inequality is worrying if no action is taken: the UK already has the highest income inequality of any major European economy, and wealth inequality is even more skewed. The Resolution Foundation highlighted that private wealth has skyrocketed to ~7× GDP (from ~3× in the 1980s), yet taxes on wealth have not risen at all as a share of GDP. That means the rich are much richer relative to the size of the economy, but we aren’t redistributing any more than before – implying greater inequality in outcomes. If this trend continues unchecked into the 2030s, social strains could worsen: younger generations locked out of home ownership, working families feeling the tax burden while billionaires pay proportionally less, etc. Many economists (not just leftists) argue that such inequality is a drag on growth, because it leads to underinvestment in human capital (e.g. kids in poorer families not reaching their potential) and weaker aggregate demand (if too much income goes to those who won’t spend it while the majority have less disposable income, putting a serious drag on consumer demand). Thus, the medium-term path could improve if policies actively reduce inequality – for example, through fairer tax systems, stronger social safety nets, and investment in education/skills for the less affluent. If, however, inequality keeps rising, we might see a continuation of political volatility (swings between populism and backlash) that makes stable economic management harder.
  

Given all these factors, what do experts think the medium-term chances are? It’s split between guarded optimism (with various political & economic reform) and continued stagnation (without reform). On one hand, you have mainstream forecasts like those from the IMF or OBR which tend to assume no dramatic policy shift – these show the UK limping along at ~1–1.5% annual growth, which implies only very slow gains in average living standards, or continued stagnation or reduction in living standards if there are inflation shocks. They also show public debt and deficits remaining a concern, meaning difficult budget choices throughout the 2030s. In this “muddle-through” scenario, we’d essentially stretch the current mediocre status into the future – not a collapse, but not solving the big problems either.

On the other hand, there is a strand of economic thought that says we can choose a different path. This more optimistic scenario would involve actively tackling inequality (through taxation and wage policies), massively investing in the economy’s future (even if it means higher public debt short-term), and updating institutions (from corporate regulation to education systems) to be fit for the 21st century. If those things happen, some experts believe the UK could regain a healthier growth rate by late-2020s or 2030s – maybe not the 3%+ of the post-war golden age, but something better than 1%. For example, one analysis by leading economists suggests that by increasing sustainable public investment by about £25–50 billion a year, the UK could boost its productivity growth substantially and “put more money in people’s pockets” over time. Another encouraging sign is technology: the rapid progress in AI and digital tech has some economists predicting a productivity uptick later this decade. A Goldman Sachs report (as cited in media) forecast that AI could raise annual GDP growth by ~0.4 percentage points in the late 2020s and early 2030s in advanced economies. If that comes true and those gains are well-distributed, it could alleviate some of the pessimism.

That said, even optimistic economists caution that without policy intervention, tech advances might simply increase inequality (the owners of capital and tech might reap most of the gains, with workers benefiting little). So policy choices make a big difference in whether a technological boost translates into broad-based prosperity or just a richer elite – circling back to the problems posed by high inequality as discussed earlier.

To sum up the medium term: Are things insurmountable when taken all together? Not necessarily insurmountable – but they are certainly formidable. Most experts would not say we are doomed to decades of decline; rather, they’d say we need to make major course corrections to avoid that fate. If we address multiple problems in concert – e.g. invest in climate solutions which also create jobs, reform taxes to fund aging costs without burdening the young, improve public services to support a productive workforce – then by the 2030s we could see renewed growth and social optimism. If we fail to do so, then a bleak outlook could unfortunately prove correct, with stagnation, social conflict, and crisis management becoming the norm. Economists use scenarios to describe this divergence: a “high road” scenario of inclusive, sustainable growth vs. a “low road” scenario of continued malaise. Right now, many are frankly concerned we’re drifting toward the low road, but they also emphasize that it’s not too late to change paths given enough political capital is spent and bold choices (such as funding government investment for future gains, despite current worsening debt statistics) are made. 

In the UK context, one encouraging development is that even the establishment voices are acknowledging the need for change. For example, the usually-cautious IMF noted that the UK government will likely face “difficult choices… given ageing-related expenditure pressures” and that there is “scope to increase [tax] revenue” to meet these needs. In plain terms, even the IMF recognizes that some combination of higher taxes, potentially for the rich and/or on wealth, or major reforms will be needed to fund pensions and healthcare by the 2030s – it is widely agreed that sticking heads in the sand (inaction) is not an option. Likewise, the Bank of England has been talking more about climate risks and inequality in recent years, which signals that these issues are seeping into orthodox establishment economic policy considerations. And as we’ll discuss below, a number of respected economists are proposing concrete solutions (like wealth taxes, big public investments, etc.) that, if implemented, could significantly brighten the medium-term outlook.

Long-Term Outlook (20–50 Years): Profound Uncertainty, with Disaster or Transformation in the Balance

Projecting 20 to 50 years into the future is obviously fraught with uncertainty – economists know their limits here. However, it’s in the long run that the combined impact of all these issues truly comes to a head. If the world fails to deal with climate change, for instance, then by the latter half of this century we could see truly catastrophic outcomes that dwarf any short-term recession. On the flip side, the long run also offers scope for transformative change: technological revolutions, new societal models, etc., that could solve today’s problems in ways we can barely imagine. So, when talking about 20–50 year outlook, experts often frame it as a range of scenarios from very dark to quite hopeful, depending on actions taken in the interim.

Let’s break down a few key dimensions for the long term:

• Climate Change (Existential Risk vs. Mitigation Success): By 2040–2075, the difference between a world where we limited warming to, say, ~1.5–2°C versus a world where we hit 4–5°C is night and day. In the bad scenario, climate change could indeed be “insurmountable” as a problem, causing widespread famine, displacement, supply chain collapses, and conflict. Economists have tried to quantify this: respondents in one survey estimated that continuing the current warming trend could impose economic damages on the order of 5% of global GDP per year by 2075, and risks skyrocket at higher warming levels (their models showed potential damages above $100 trillion annually in extreme scenarios). Five percent of GDP every year is enormous – for perspective, the 2008–09 global financial crisis was a one-time hit of a few percent of GDP. Climate damage at 5% per year, and rising, would basically be a permanent Depression-like drag on the world economy, effectively killing almost all economic and prosperity growth, and potentially collapsing entire economies and governments. This would likely manifest as certain regions becoming uninhabitable (too hot or flooded) and losing all economic output, more frequent disasters destroying capital stock, and constant adaptation costs (e.g. building sea walls, relocating cities). In such a scenario, global supply chains and trade could break down, and we might indeed see resource wars or mass migrations causing socio-political collapse in places. It’s a frightening prospect – and one reason virtually all economists (98% in one poll) now agree that “immediate and drastic action” on climate change is necessary. The good news is that long-term forecasting also allows for the possibility that we do take action: rapid decarbonization, reforestation, and innovation could avert the worst. Many economists are optimistic that achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century, while very challenging, is feasible and cost-effective compared to the damages of inaction. If humanity rises to this challenge, then by 2075 the climate threat would be stabilizing – meaning we’d still have to live with a changed climate, but perhaps without apocalyptic collapse. In that more hopeful long-term scenario, the investments we make now in clean energy might by then be paying off in the form of abundant, cheap renewable power; new technologies (like maybe fusion energy or advanced carbon capture) could be coming online, and societies would have transitioned to sustainable practices. This is the future some envision when they talk about a “Green Industrial Revolution” – a future where we’ve solved the energy/climate problem and unlocked a new era of prosperity. It’s possible, but it requires global coordination and political will on a scale we haven’t yet mustered. Economists often point out that climate change is the ultimate “externality” problem – it can’t be solved by markets alone; it needs collective action. Over a 50-year span, either we get that collective action together, or we pay the price. So, long-term, climate is the swing factor between something like “civilizational decline” and “sustainable rejuvenation.”
  

• Demographics and Society: By 2075, most Western countries will have aged significantly, unless offset by immigration (or unexpected baby booms). The global population growth is projected to essentially zero out by the late 21st century and some countries will shrink in population. This could ease some environmental pressures but introduces economic challenges (smaller workforce, a need for automation, etc.). Japan and some European countries are precursors of what a “super-aged” society looks like. Economists debate the long-term implications: some fear a stagnant, geriatric world with low innovation and high dependency ratios (lots of pensioners per worker); others think humanity might adapt through longer working lives, robots doing the heavy lifting, and a focus on quality of life over constant population growth. It’s worth noting that a stabilizing global population might be a good thing for the climate and resource sustainability – but it will demand new economic models (for instance, growth may slow, expectations of ever-increasing profits will need to change, and we might shift focus to per-capita well-being rather than aggregate GDP). Some heterodox economists (like proponents of “degrowth” or steady-state economy) actually argue that by 2050 we should aim to have lower material consumption in rich countries, but distributed more equally, to live within sustainable planetary boundaries. Whether that vision can be achieved without social upheaval is an open question. From a mainstream perspective, a key to long-run prosperity will be continuous innovation – finding new technologies and efficiencies to compensate for labor shortages and to create new industries (which will require a shift away from the low investment the UK has experienced for the last 15 years). Historically, periods of great technological change (industrial revolutions, digital revolution) have driven growth. The question is, what’s the next big revolution by 2050? Many point to AI and biotechnology as candidates. If AI reaches a stage of automating a lot of work (while humanity still controls it constructively), it could potentially boost productivity dramatically – some refer to this as the possibility of an “AI-driven growth surge.” In theory, with advanced AI and automation, a shrinking human workforce could still produce plenty of goods and services. But again, distribution will be key: if only a few own the AI and robots, inequality could skyrocket. Long-term thinkers worry about that intersection of tech and inequality – it could lead to a sort of neo-feudal scenario (a tiny elite owns the productive assets, masses are unemployed or in precarity), or if managed well, it could lead to unprecedented leisure and prosperity for all; some suggest a possible utopian scenario of AI/robots doing all the work while humans enjoy a Universal Basic Income. Economists’ consensus is hard to pin down here, but there is at least agreement that education and skills will need to evolve massively to keep humans relevant and productively employed alongside advanced technology. Over 20–50 years, human capital development (investing in people’s skills, adaptability, and health) might be the most important determinant of whether things get better or worse. Societies that invest in their people could navigate the tech shifts successfully; those that don’t might see more inequality, decline, and unrest.
  

• Political and Institutional Trajectory: Over a half-century, political systems can change dramatically. We could see democratic renewal or democratic decay. For instance, if current trends of polarization and authoritarian-populist appeal continue, by 2040 or 2050 some countries that are democratic today might become autocratic, and vice versa. This matters for the economy because history shows that stable, inclusive institutions tend to foster better long-run growth (that’s essentially the thesis of economists Acemoglu & Robinson in Why Nations Fail). If billionaire influence and extreme inequality continue to grow, we might effectively have oligarchic rule in many places, which could entrench policies that favor the few at the expense of overall prosperity. On the other hand, there could be backlashes leading to reforms (for example, political campaign finance reform, stronger antitrust actions against tech monopolies, new media regulations to prevent disinformation). The long-run consensus is hard to gauge, but many economists and political scientists are warning that current levels of inequality are unhealthy for democracy and thus for economic health in the long run, and could – if left unchecked – create a runaway inequality scenario. If we correct that – say, through wealth taxes or other measures – we might restore a more broadly beneficial balance of power by mid-century. If not, the feedback loop of money -> politics -> more money for the rich could result in what some call a “plutonomy” (economy of, by, and for the wealthy). Societies in that state historically tend to become unstable (think late 19th-century Gilded Age leading to social reforms, or worse, the collapse of unequal societies in revolutions). So, one could say the long-term choice is between reform or rupture: either we find ways to reform capitalism to be more inclusive and sustainable, or eventually there may be ruptures (social collapse, revolution, etc.). It’s obviously very hard to predict which path will dominate globally, and it could vary by country.
  

In essence, by the latter half of the 21st century, either we will have overcome many of these challenges through innovation and reform – or the challenges will have overcome us. Economists’ “consensus” on the long term is really just an acknowledgement of the stakes: virtually all agree that issues like climate change must be dealt with to avoid disaster, and that aging and inequality must be managed to maintain economic stability. There isn’t a single agreed probability for success or failure; rather, they lay out the conditions for success. For example: If we price carbon properly, invest in green tech, and cooperate internationally, then we can limit warming and still grow the economy. And/or if we implement policies to fairly distribute the gains of technology, then AI could usher in a new era of prosperity for all – or else possibly see a plutocratic society in which the majority of humans suffer. These if-thens are well studied, but they depend on political will and action that needs to start now. 

One meta-trend economists often mention for the long run is the importance of institutions and governance. Over 50 years, countries with flexible, forward-looking, forward-planning governance will adapt and likely thrive, whereas those stuck in short-termism, reactionary politics, or corruption will fall behind or collapse. In that sense, part of the expert consensus is a call for better governance – thinking ahead, investing ahead, and cooperating globally. The concerns raised (like governments failing to invest or media manipulation by billionaires) point to weaknesses in our current governance as these things can be changed with enough political will. For instance, fiscal strains from debt and aging can be fixed by policy choices (raising retirement ages, broadening the tax base, etc.), if politicians act before crises hit. Similarly, the influence of money in politics can be curbed by campaign finance reforms or antitrust actions (again, decisions that societies can choose to make).

In summary, the long-term outlook is not set in stone – it’s more like a fork in the road. If someone only looks at the negative trends and assumes they all continue worsening, then the future around 2050 indeed looks very bleak (environmental collapse, aging populations overwhelming budgets, oligarchic politics, etc.). Many economists would agree that if those trends continue unchecked, the result would be dire. However, economists also tend to believe in the power of incentives and policy to change trends. The very fact that we’re discussing these problems means there is potential to address them. For instance, a couple decades ago, climate change was not taken seriously by economists; now it’s mainstream, and as noted, the vast majority of economists support urgent climate action and believe achieving net-zero by mid-century is worth it. That shift in expert opinion can translate into policy (we see many governments setting zero-carbon targets, implementing carbon pricing, etc.). It might be too slow for comfort, but it’s happening. Likewise, inequality has become a huge topic in economics since the 2010s (thanks in part to Thomas Piketty and others); it’s no longer assumed that inequality will just fix itself. So by 2050, perhaps we will have new institutions – like global wealth registries to prevent tax evasion, or stronger unions, or even universal basic incomes – that rebalance things. These are all ideas being actively discussed by economists today. However, we also see some countries like the USA's current anti-environmentalism and pro-inequality shifts already actively, and deliberately, moving against the direction that economists argue societies need to move in. 

So, will things get better any time soon? in the long-run sense: “better” is possible, but it will take time and deliberate effort. In the near term, as discussed, you shouldn’t expect miraculous improvement. In the medium term, there’s hope if we do the right things. In the long term, experts argue it’s truly a question of collapse vs. transformation: we either solve the big problems – starting now –  or they overwhelm us. No reputable expert would claim it’s easy, but neither do most think it’s hopeless. The consensus is that there are paths forward – just very challenging ones.

What Can Be Done? – Policy Solutions and Expert Recommendations (focusing on the UK)

Given this rather sobering outlook, it’s natural to ask: So what do economists suggest we do to actually make things better? Several ideas are popular – wealth taxes, cracking down on tax avoidance, lowering taxes on workers, Keynesian investments, etc. – but do leading economists agree? The answer is that many economists (especially outside the most conservative circles) do advocate some version of these changes. There is certainly not a unanimous view (economists love to debate policy), but there are strong strands of expert opinion backing each of these major reforms. Let’s go through them one by one, and note what the consensus or prominent views are:

• Wealth Tax / Taxing the Rich: The idea of a direct net wealth tax (an annual tax on very high net worth) has gained traction among economists in recent years, especially as wealth inequality has soared. In the UK, a group of over two dozen leading economists – including Thomas Piketty (famous for his work on inequality), Jayati Ghosh, Ha-Joon Chang, and others – wrote an open letter in 2025 urging the government to implement a modest wealth tax on fortunes over £10 million. They argued that the UK “cannot allow extreme wealth inequality to deepen while millions struggle,” calling a progressive wealth tax a “critical step” to raise revenue and improve fairness. According to their analysis, even a 1–2% tax on assets above £10m could raise on the order of £20–30 billion per year for the UK exchequer. That money could be used to avoid austerity cuts and fund public services or investment. This shows that some very prominent economists do agree on taxing wealth. Piketty, in particular, has championed a global wealth tax for years as a way to curb inequality. Now, it’s worth noting that not all economists are on board with an annual wealth tax – there are debates about feasibility (valuation of assets, risk of capital flight, obfuscation to hide true wealth). Even the UK’s Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), a respected think tank, has been somewhat skeptical of a brand new wealth tax, suggesting that closing loopholes in existing taxes (capital gains, inheritance, property taxes) might achieve similar goals without the complexity of a new tax. But importantly, there is a broad consensus amongst economists that the wealthy could and should pay more in tax one way or another. The Resolution Foundation’s inquiry, for example, highlights how wealth went up dramatically but “wealth taxes remain roughly where they were 15 or 35 years ago, around 3% of GDP” – implying there’s room to increase them. They specifically point out fixes like updating property taxes (the UK’s council tax is infamously still based on 1991 home values) and tightening inheritance tax loopholes. These kinds of measures have a lot of expert support. Even mainstream bodies (OECD, IMF) in recent reports have softly suggested countries consider more property and inheritance taxation, because those tend to hit the wealthy more and distort the economy less than taxing wages. In short, taxing wealth is no longer a fringe idea – it’s quite mainstream among economists concerned with inequality. The main debate is about how to do it effectively. The idea of taxing citizens no matter where they live (to prevent rich folks from simply moving abroad to avoid taxes) is in line with proposals by economists like Gabriel Zucman and others who work on tax justice. The US already taxes its citizens globally; some have suggested the UK could consider similar rules for ultra-rich emigrants. Additionally, international cooperation on taxation is a big theme: economists have been instrumental in the push for a global minimum corporate tax to stop multinational corporations from offshoring profits. In 2021, over 130 countries (guided by OECD proposals) agreed to set a minimum 15% corporate tax on large multinationals – a plan that economists like Joseph Stiglitz applauded as a step toward closing the corporate tax dodging era. By 2025, the UK has also moved to scrap the notorious “non-domiciled” tax status that allowed rich residents to avoid tax on overseas income. This shows policy following expert advice: economists had long criticized the 'non-dom' regime as unfair and economically unsound, and finally it’s being reformed. So, the consensus is that more needs to be done to tax wealth and mobile capital fairly. While there’s debate on the exact method (wealth tax vs. better enforcement of existing taxes), you’ll find a lot of economists agreeing with the spirit of “tax the rich more.” It’s seen as both a justice issue and a pragmatic way to raise revenue without hurting demand (as the rich's vast increases in wealth over recent years show they clearly have surplus funds).
  

• Lower Taxes on Working People (and Shifting the Tax Burden): This goes hand-in-hand with the above. Economists often talk about the tax mix – basically, are we taxing “good” things or “bad” things? Many argue that in the UK (and US, etc.), we rely too much on taxing labor income and not enough on taxing capital, land, pollution, etc. Even quite centrist economists now favor tax reforms that lighten the load on low and middle-wage workers. For example, raising the personal income tax allowance, reducing payroll taxes (National Insurance) on lower earners, or even implementing an earned income tax credit – these are widely discussed policies to improve work incentives and take-home pay. The IMF, in its UK assessment, noted that the authorities’ new fiscal plans claim to balance growth and sustainability – implicitly acknowledging that raising taxes on workers in a stagnant wage environment is problematic. In practice, however, recent governments have often done the opposite (the current UK government actually raised National Insurance on employers recently, drawing criticism for hurting job creation). But the direction many experts suggest is: shift taxes off of productive activity (like hiring workers) and onto unproductive or harmful things. Those “harmful” things could be carbon emissions (carbon tax), tobacco (which we already do), or economic rents like land value. A concrete example: some economists advocate replacing council tax and stamp duty with a proper land value tax, which would predominantly hit wealthy landowners and relieve renters and productive businesses, while also spurring owners of non-productive land to make it productive (increasing economic output and productivity). Another example: reducing VAT on basic goods (to help consumers) while closing tax loopholes for corporations. Overall, the concept of progressive taxation – meaning the richer pay a higher percentage – is something most economists (aside from some libertarians) accept as reasonable to maintain social balance. Given the stagnant wages and rising cost of living of the last 15 years, there is strong expert support for policies that effectively give a raise to workers – either through direct tax cuts for them or through wage subsidies. Some economists even champion significantly higher minimum wages or stronger unions to push up wages, which indirectly shifts income from profits (held by shareholders) to labour. That’s more of a labour market policy, but it’s related: the idea is to make sure working pays. The “breakdown of the social contract” some describe  – working hard yet standing still financially – is something economists find very worrying. For instance, Torsten Bell (Resolution Foundation) highlighted how real wages in 2024 are no higher than in 2008, calling it a historic failure of successive governments. He and others recommend measures like strengthening collective bargaining or targeted tax relief to ensure any future productivity gains are shared with workers (in the decades before 2008, UK workers did get their share of growth; that link needs restoring).
  

• Keynesian Government Investment & Fiscal Policy: There is a significant faction of economists who agree that, in the current context, focusing too much on reducing debt is counterproductive, and that borrowing to invest in the economy will pay off in growth. This is especially true when interest rates are low – though rates have risen recently, they are still historically moderate and markets still lend to the UK for 30-year maturities at rates that, adjusted for inflation, are not exorbitant. The argument goes: if the government can borrow at, say, 2-3% real interest and invest in projects that yield a higher social return (better transport reduces business costs, education raises future productivity, etc.), then it’s a net win and actually improves future fiscal health by expanding the economy. During the 2010s, critics say the UK’s austerity (sharp cuts to public investment and services) was a mistake that led to the stagnation we now face. In fact, even the IMF later acknowledged that austerity had larger negative effects on growth than anticipated. Today, bodies like the IMF and OBR still caution about debt, but they usually exempt high-quality investment spending from their warnings. For example, the OBR noted that current fiscal rules (like keeping debt falling) have often failed and that new approaches should be sought; they actually sounded almost frustrated that despite many frameworks to limit debt, underlying debt kept rising anyway. That implies the focus should be on growing the denominator (GDP) rather than just cutting the numerator (debt). The NIESR report cited earlier is one clear call: they said the UK should “no longer include borrowing to fund investment” in its self-imposed fiscal rules, effectively urging the government to separate the capital (investment in the future) budget from the day-to-day budget. This is textbook Keynesian thinking – treat borrowing for investment like a different category, because it’s building future assets and fuelling future growth. They even lamented that sticking to strict fiscal rules and not expanding investment means we “continue to fail in addressing our deep-set problems”. Many economists have echoed this; for instance, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has repeatedly argued in favour of large public investments (in infrastructure, green tech, education) financed by debt if needed, because the returns – a more productive workforce, new industries, etc. – will make the debt manageable, with future growth enabling accelerated repayment. Similarly, Keynesians and proponents of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) argue that as long as a country like the UK borrows in its own currency and inflation is under control, it has more fiscal space than traditionally thought. In the wake of COVID, we actually saw a test of this: the UK borrowed hundreds of billions (debt jumped above 100% of GDP) to support the economy, and disaster did not strike from the borrowing itself (the continued issues we face now are more supply-chain and energy related, as well as the result of years of austerity and self-imposed shocks like brexit). Interest rates did rise, but largely due to global inflation, not because bond markets refused to lend to the UK. So, many experts took that as evidence that we shouldn’t be overly scared of debt, especially when it’s put to productive use. Of course, there are still economists – often more conservative – who warn against excessive debt (pointing to the burden of interest costs, which in the UK’s case have risen since a lot of UK debt is inflation-indexed). The OBR in 2025 did warn that, on current course, debt could spiral unsustainably in the decades ahead. But that warning is precisely why others say we should borrow now to invest in growth for the future, so that the economy is larger and can sustain the debt in the coming decades. It’s a classic debate: austerity vs. stimulus. At the moment, the intellectual tide has shifted more towards stimulus/investment than a decade ago, where austerity won out. For example, the US under Biden enacted huge investment packages (on infrastructure and clean energy), which many economists applauded as overdue Keynesian policy – and notably, the IMF upgraded US growth forecasts as a result. If the UK were to do something similar, most economists would likely support it provided the money is spent wisely. (That caveat is important – some point out that the government must have the capacity to spend on good projects, not waste. The NIESR director did question if the British state currently has the capacity to efficiently deploy a big investment increase.) Still, the experts’ consensus solution to the UK’s low-growth trap is indeed a Keynesian one: stimulate private investment by using public investment as a catalyst, and do so even if it means higher borrowing in the short run. This goes hand in hand with structural reforms (like planning reform to allow more housing and infrastructure to be built, which economists also encourage).
  

• Crackdown on Corporate Tax Avoidance and Fair Global Taxation: Some specifically mention taxing corporations that do business in the UK and preventing them from offshoring profits (the classic example being big tech companies shifting profits to low-tax havens). On this, there is also strong support among economists for coordinated global action. As noted, a worldwide agreement for a 15% minimum corporate tax is in the works, inspired by research that shows trillions of profits were essentially escaping fair taxation. Economists like Gabriel Zucman, Emmanuel Saez, etc., provided much of the data that spurred this policy effort. The consensus is that tax competition between countries (the race to the bottom in corporate tax rates) was harmful overall, and that cooperation is needed to ensure big multinationals pay something closer to their fair share. The UK stands to gain if these rules come into effect, since it’s a large market where companies make money (they won't continue to be able to report near-zero profits here without paying the minimum tax somewhere). Domestically, the UK could also reform how it taxes multinationals – for instance, using something called unitary taxation (taxing a share of a company’s global profits proportional to sales in the UK). While details get technical, the high-level point is economists agree, the era of easy offshoring and profit-shifting needs to end. Not only would that raise government revenues, it would also level the playing field for domestic businesses (a local UK shop pays its taxes; why should an internet giant pay almost nothing?). Recent years have seen HMRC get more funding to pursue evasion, and there’s been talk of a new digital services tax (already introduced as a stopgap). So movement is happening, backed by economic logic. More broadly, the notion of taxing citizens no matter where they reside (like the US does) is not a consensus position globally – most countries don’t do it – but there’s been discussion of expatriation taxes for the ultra-rich (for example, if a UK billionaire tries to relocate to Monaco or Dubai to dodge taxes, perhaps the UK could impose an exit tax or continue taxing UK-source income). Economists in the tax justice field support such measures to avoid a scenario where the rich become, effectively, stateless for tax purposes. In short, ensuring corporations and the ultra-rich can’t easily evade taxation is a mainstream policy goal now, shared by many experts and international bodies.
  

• Other Ideas – Investment in Public Services, Education, R&D: Besides these, economists often highlight investing in human capital as crucial. For the UK, that means reversing the cuts in education spending, funding skills training, and crucially, fixing public health (given the recent rise in working age people who have limited working capacity or are economically inactive due to health issues). As we saw, even a Treasury minister openly said that spending on health (the NHS) is “pro-growth” because it removes hidden costs on businesses. The consensus among economists is that a healthy, well-educated workforce is the foundation for productivity; cuts to education and health care spending in real terms in recent years has unquestionably harmed productivity. Nearly all serious proposals for UK economic renewal include measures like expanding early childhood education, vocational training, and boosting R&D investment (the UK spends less on R&D as a share of GDP than the US, Germany, etc.). These may not yield results overnight, but over a 5–20 year span, they’re vital. Economists also talk about regional rebalancing – spreading growth beyond London/Southeast – which might involve infrastructure projects (e.g. better transport links in the North) and empowering local governments to drive development. This ties into addressing inequality, because spatial inequality (rich vs poor regions) is very high in the UK. The idea of “levelling up” has economic merit if done genuinely – it could unlock productivity in areas that have been left behind.
  

Overall, it appears a significant cohort of economists, even mainstream ones, increasingly align with what many call “new Keynesian” ideas – more progressive taxation, bold public investment, prioritizing growth over short-term deficit concerns, and strengthening the social safety nets. Those economists would likely tell you k7C1NwOyl3Athat pessimism is warranted if we stick to neoliberal, austerity-lite policies, but that there is plenty of room for optimism if we shift course. They often point to historical precedents: the post-WWII era saw massive public debt but also huge growth and social progress because governments invested in reconstruction, new institutions (like the NHS in 1948), and education. Similarly, they argue, facing today’s polycrisis (climate + inequality + aging), we need a comparable mobilization of resources – a “New Deal” or “Marshall Plan” scale effort.

Notably, economists of all stripes agree that investing in the climate transition now is far cheaper than dealing with climate catastrophe later. That's an area of near-unanimity: do not skimp on climate-related investment. Whether that’s flood defences, green energy, or R&D in clean tech, it’s seen as essential “future-proofing” of the economy. This aligns with Keynesian stimulus too, since many climate projects create jobs.

Finally, a crucial thing that can be done – which isn’t a policy per se but a meta-point – is improving governance and long-term planning. The UK in particular has suffered from short-termism and policy zig-zags (frequent changes in direction, e.g., on energy policy or industrial strategy, which have deterred investors). Economists frequently bemoan this and suggest establishing more independent or cross-party frameworks that commit to long-term strategies (for instance, an independent infrastructure commission, or multi-decade skills programs that survive electoral cycles). It’s less tangible than a tax or spending policy, but creating stable expectations for businesses is important for turning the economy around.

Conclusion: Cautious Optimism?

So, should we be pessimistic? In the short term, yes – most experts would validate a pessimistic outlook for the next few years given the data on hand. In the medium to long term, pessimism is understandable but perhaps slightly one-sided: economists would say there are pathways to a better future, albeit challenging ones. There isn't a magic solution that suddenly fixes everything, but maybe what could temper the pessimism is the recognition that these problems, as overwhelming as they seem together, can be addressed together by a coherent strategy and governmental action. The notion of a “New Social Contract” is emerging among thought leaders – meaning a new understanding between government, citizens, and business that tackles inequality, ensures decent livelihoods, and commits to sustainability. It’s admittedly still more of an idea than reality, but it’s something economists, political scientists, and activists are increasingly talking about and even agreeing upon (a rare thing for economists).

What is the consensus on things getting better soon? The consensus is that “soon” (the next 1–5 years) will likely continue to be tough for ordinary people, especially in the UK. Stagnant or only slowly rising incomes, high costs, and fiscal constraints will persist in that timeframe. Beyond that, whether things get better is up to us – that’s the implicit expert view. If we implement the kinds of changes discussed (tax reforms, investment in productive capacity, climate action, etc.), then by the 2030s we could see a social and economic revitalization: higher productivity, more equitable growth, and new industries creating jobs (for example, a thriving green energy sector, or AI-driven productivity boosts that don’t just enrich Big Tech but spread through the whole economy). If we fail to act boldly, then the various issues discussed will indeed compound and possibly feed off each other. In a worst-case combination, we’d have an economy crippled by climate costs and aging costs, while social unrest and populist/authoritarian politics destroy trust and stability – a recipe for very bleak decades. Economists certainly acknowledge that as a possibility (sometimes called the “doom loop” of debt and low growth or “secular stagnation” in academic terms). However, they tend not to throw up their hands and say it’s inevitable; rather they use such projections to urge policymakers to make different, bold choices and act now.

To give you a sense of tone: an economist might say “Yes, the situation is grave, but it’s not hopeless – it’s a call to action.” For example, the OBR bluntly stated “The UK cannot afford the array of promises it has made to the public” on the current path, effectively warning that the status quo is unsustainable. That sounds dire (and it is a stark warning), but it’s also implicitly telling the government and public: we either make significant changes (e.g., adjust pensions, raise taxes, reduce inequality, and boost investment/productivity) or we face fiscal crisis. Likewise, the economists’ letter about a wealth tax said this could “avoid a return to austerity” – highlighting that there are alternatives to endless cuts and social decline (the “doom loop”). 

In the UK, the upcoming years will be crucial. A lot of experts are looking to the relatively new Labour government to see if they will implement some of these much-needed policies. There’s discussion, for instance, that the UK might finally invest big in home insulation (to lower energy bills and emissions), or in new transport in the North, etc. If those happen, they could gradually improve the economic situation.

In conclusion, the notion that “together these problems seem insurmountable” is a sentiment many people share right now, and economists absolutely recognize why. The world is indeed facing a “polycrisis” – multiple interlocking crises – which is daunting. However, the expert consensus is not that all is lost; it’s that business-as-usual is lost. Things won’t get better on their own, or by keeping doing what we have been doing, or by minor tweaks. But there is a consensus that with significant policy shifts – many of which we’ve discussed – things can get better over time. As one report put it, Britain needs “a clear route to a better tomorrow” because currently many feel that route is lacking, and people are losing hope (especially Britain's young people, who have never known a period of sustained economic growth). Economists are trying to map out that route: it involves renewing the social contract (higher wages, better public services), harnessing new technologies, investing in people, and making the economy fairer and greener. There’s considerable agreement on these broad goals, even if the debate continues on the exact means.

So, you are right to be concerned – the challenges are very real. But you might take some solace in knowing that a lot of brainpower is being devoted to solving these problems, and viable solutions exist on paper. The bigger question is one of politics and implementation, on which economists don’t have a crystal ball. If those solutions are pursued, the pessimistic trajectory can be altered. If not, each problem could amplify the others. 

In summary, experts don’t think we’re destined for doom, but they do think we’re at a critical juncture. The next few years and decisions will heavily influence whether, in a decade or two, we’ll be looking back at the 2020s as the start of a turnaround or as the beginning of a long decline - potentially even into global collapse. The consensus short-term view is guarded (things remain rough). The medium-term view is that improvement is possible but not automatic (it requires big policy moves). And long-term, it’s truly a race between problem-solving and catastrophe. Many economists and other experts are essentially saying: “We have the tools to fix much of this – what we need is the collective will to use them.”

Sources:

• Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: A New Economic Strategy for Britain, Dec. 2023 – documenting 15 years of stagnant UK incomes and the need for a new approach.

• Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) Fiscal Report 2025 – warns UK public finances are on an “unsustainable” path long-term due to pensions and climate costs, with current policies leading to debt reaching 270% of GDP by 2070.

• World Economic Forum, Chief Economists Outlook (Sept 2024) – finds cautious optimism for modest growth, but emphasizes majority of economists say progress on sustainability and equality is crucial even at the expense of headline GDP.

• Policy Survey of Economists on Climate (2021) – 76% of climate economists agree climate change will likely reduce global growth, and 70% say it will increase inequality within countries. An overwhelming 98% call for “immediate and drastic” climate action.

• Heather Stewart, The Guardian (Jul 2025) – coverage of OBR and economists’ advice: “UK cannot afford promises… long run unsustainable” without policy change. Also notes OBR’s estimate that a 3°C warming could add 74% of GDP to UK debt by 2070.

• Richard Partington, The Guardian (Jul 2025) – report on Piketty and other top economists urging a UK wealth tax on £10m+ fortunes to raise “tens of billions” and fight extreme inequality. They argue this would prevent a return to austerity by taxing those who can afford it.

• David Milliken, Reuters (Aug 2024) – summary of NIESR’s call for doubling UK public investment (additional £50bn a year) funded by borrowing, because otherwise growth will hover barely above 1% and the government will miss its growth targets. NIESR suggests excluding investment borrowing from fiscal rules to allow this stimulus.

• Heather Stewart, The Guardian (Feb 2025) – interview with Torsten Bell (pensions minister, ex-Resolution Foundation) stating that investing in fixing “crumbling” public services is pro-growth, because “you cannot have a failing state and a growing economy.” He highlights that a typical man’s earnings in 2024 are 7% lower than 20 years prior – evidence of a broken social contract.

• IMF Article IV Report on UK (May 2025) – projects 1.2% growth in 2025 for UK with weak productivity dragging the medium term, and explicitly says “in the longer term, difficult fiscal choices will be needed” as aging pushes up spending ~8% of GDP by 2050. Recommends aligning spending with resources (code for raising revenue or cutting promises) and praises focus on productivity-enhancing reforms.

• Valentino Larcinese & Alberto Parmigiani, LPE Project blog (Feb 2024) – discuss the vicious spiral of political and economic inequality, noting that wealthy individuals’ control of media and outsized political influence can steer policy to favor elites, which then leads to further inequality. This academic perspective supports the view that unchecked inequality threatens democracy and requires intervention.

• https://cls.ucl.ac.uk/twentysomethings-think-hard-work-doesnt-pay-nowadays-new-study-finds/

• https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/feb/20/investment-uk-crumbling-public-services-pro-growth-torsten-bell

• https://www.weforum.org/videos/chief-economist-outlook-09-24/

• https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350671579_Gauging_Economic_Consensus_on_Climate_Change

• https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/jul/08/uk-public-finances-obr-national-debt-gdp

• https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/jul/28/starmer-reeves-uk-wealth-tax-thomas-piketty

• https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-should-double-public-investment-boost-growth-think-tank-says-2024-08-06/